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	Introduction
But	
- It is proj	impossible to predict this on individual ject basis
- It is mal	even not recommended to focus on policy kers' short term wishes
- L F	.eads to short 'economic' thinking <> longer term R&D thinking
- It m - 7	hight even be useless to try do this Time lag
So the	en what can we do to please policy makers?



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BA	-concepts
Multidimensional projects and pro – Scale – Scope – Intelligence – Speed – Output & Impac – Cooperation – Strategy –	influence of funding on R&D&I ocesses:
to improve the firr	ns innovation performance.
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BA concepts				
Resource-based concepts Result-based concepts (input) (output)				
Project Input	Scope and scale Network	Competence Output Acceleration Strategic		
Process-based concepts (behavioural)				
Main research question: Does funding R&D-projects lead to BA ?				
CASE Study IWT				







Table 2: Representativity of the samples	Sa	mp	es		
Number of companies by size	Population	%	Sample	%	Representativit
Experimental group					
Large companies	130	18%	36	19%	28%
SMEs	403	57%	111	57%	28%
Starters	179	25%	47	24%	26%
Total	712	100%	194	100%	27%
Control group A					
Large companies	35	12%	9	10%	26%
SMEs	162	55%	53	60%	33%
Starters	96	33%	26	30%	27%
Total	293	100%	88	100%	30%
Control group B					
Large companies	76	14%	13	13%	17%
SMEs	400	76%	81	81%	20%
Starters	51	10%	6	6%	12%
Total	527	100%	100	100%	19%

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Resul	ts Additionality Study
 Project Add. (= 40% of proje support 	High if project is cancelled without support) ects would not have taken place without
 50% with a s 	smaller budget
 Input Add. (=Hig support) 	gh if companies spend more on R&D due to
 No crowding 	out
 1€ funding – 	0.85 – 1.34€ add. R&D spending by firm
 Follow up pr 	ojects financed internally
 No confirma funding to at 	tion for labeling effect (= leverage effect of IWT tract additional financial means)
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Ambitions (scale	an	d so	cope	e)
able 12: Criteria used for IWT application	Large	SMEs	Starters	Total
for the most innovative project	20.90			
Experimental group	3,71	3,58	3,45	3,57
Control group A	3,67	2,88**	3,60	3,24*
for the project which was closest to the core of my activities				
Experimental group	2,86	3,22	3,36	3,20
Control group A	3,66	3,00	3,20	3,00
for the project that had the most fundamental research character				
Experimental group	3,57	3,14	3,09	3,19
Control group A	3,33	2,11***	3,00	2,58***
for projects which were larger than a certain critical size				
Experimental group	2,57	3,17	2,91	2,92
Control group A	3,33	2,11**	2,40	2,41*
for the most risky project				
Experimental group	3,29	2,53	3,00	2,68
Control aroun A	2.67	1.88*	2.40	2,18*





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Some hypotheses tested				
Hypotheses	Results	Not rejected/rejected		
Hypothesis 1: The larger the share of IWT subsidy in R&D, the higher the	IWT support is of crucial importance especially for SMEs. For project and outcome additionality we indeed can observe a higher additionality (positive	Not rejected for outcome and project additionality		
additionality.	and significant effects). No effect can be observed concerning competence additionality.	Rejected for competence additionality		
Hypothesis 2: Subsidies for start-ups have more additionality, in particular outcome additionality.	Large firms and SMEs have less outcome additionality (negative significant effect). As the start-ups are the baseline, the start-ups show higher levels of outcome additionality.	Not rejected for outcome additionality		
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Some hypotheses tested					
Hypotheses	Results	Not rejected/rejected			
Hypothesis 3: Multi-partner projects	Multi-partner projects have higher competence additionality (positive and significant effects) than projects with only one partner. This does not hold for outcome additionality (pogative	Not rejected for competence additionality			
nave a higher daditionality.	and significant effects). In the case of project additionality, there is no significant relationship.	Rejected for outcome and project additionality			
Hypothesis 4: Companies that have a high turnover abroad will be able to	For strongly internationalizing companies, lower project additionality can be observed (meaning: these	Rejected			
achieve higher levels of additionality than those companies that are not yet international.	companies would self-finance the project). For both outcome and competence additionality there is no significant relationship.	(for all types of additionality)			
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Some hypotheses tested				
Hypotheses	Results	Not rejected/rejected		
Hypothesis 5: Companies with a more professionalized R&D organisation will have less competence additionality.	A more professionalized R&D company achieves lower levels of competence additionality. They 'learn' less from participation in IWT projects.	Not rejected		
Hypothesis 6: First projects lead to higher additionality than subsequent projects.	For companies with more than one project, the project additionality is lower. Outcome additionality, as well as competence additionality are however positively affected (more opportunities to learn).	Not rejected for project additionality Rejected for outcome and competence additionality		
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Some hypotheses tested				
Hypotheses	Results	Not rejected/rejected		
Hypothesis 7: If companies have more cash-flow (investment slack) they would have a higher additionality.	We do not find any significant influence of cash flow on any type of additionality.	Rejected (for all types		
Hypothesis 8: Additionality, in particular outcome additionality, is more likely to show up the longer ago the project has been finished.	There is a positive and significant relationship between the project age and outcome additionality.	of additionality) Not rejected for outcome additionality		
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